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I. INTRODUCTION
During the past year-roughly since the Republican Party
gained a majority of the seats in both houses of the Congress-
there has been a groundswell of interest in a fundamental tax re-
form in the United States. In general, the proposals that are now
being discussed are different from reforms that have been enacted
or widely discussed in the past, including the massive Tax Reform
Act of 1986.1 Whereas previous tax reform debates have focused
on changing the income tax, the predominant theme of the current
debate revolves around whether to replace the income tax with an
entirely different type of tax-namely, a tax based on consump-
tion.
2
If these reform efforts succeed-or even if they do not succeed
but are taken seriously-there will be important repercussions in
other countries, including the countries of the Western Hemi-
sphere. If these efforts succeed, other countries may be tempted to
imitate the United States (as many did after the 1986 Reform) by
changing their tax systems to resemble the new U.S. system.3
Even if other countries do not change their tax systems, they may
need to alter their tax structures to respond to the changes in the
U.S. system. These changes might be even more fundamental
1. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2. It is important to note, however, that in the U.S. Treasury Department's 1984
proposals consumption taxes were considered before being rejected in favor of a reformed
income tax. 1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIM.
PuciTy, AND ECONOMIc GROWTH 30-33 (1984) [hereinafter TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS].
3. On these adjustments, see Vito Tanzi, The Response of Other Industrial Coun-
tries to the U.S. Tax Reform Act, 40 NATL TAX J. 339, 342-53 (1987) [hereinafter Tanzi,
The Response of Other Industrial Countries]; Vito Tanzi, Tax Reform in Industrial Coun-
tries and the Impact of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 42 BULL. INTL FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 51, 62-63 (1988) [hereinafter Tanzi, Tax Reform in Industrial Coun-
tries]; John Whalley, Foreign Responses to U.S. Tax Reform, in DO TAXES MATTER: THE
IMPACT OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 286, 286-87, 301-09 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1990).
[Vol. 29:1-2
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than the adjustments triggered by the 1986 Reform. 4 Even if a
fundamental reform does not occur in the United States, the U.S.
tax reform debate may stimulate debate, and possibly reform,
throughout the Americas.
This article describes some of the potential international re-
percussions of the U.S. debate on a consumption-based tax and fo-
cuses on the potential effects of this debate on the South American
countries. Part II outlines the salient features of the most impor-
tant and most novel consumption-based tax reform plans. For the
most part, Part II does not concentrate on proposals merely to re-
form the income tax, which would be far less fundamental;5 nor
does it describe or analyze the value added tax (VAT) or retail
sales tax (RST) in detail. These forms of tax are generally famil-
iar; most countries of Latin America already have VATs.6 Part III
describes the motivations for the current wave of tax reform fever
and discusses the extent to which expectations would be achieved
under the various plans. Like Part II, Part III concentrates only
on the most novel plans and plans that are most likely to be seri-
ous contenders. Part IV discusses international implications of
the reforms, including whether the United States would allow
foreign tax credits for a consumption-based tax levied by another
country. Part V discusses the experience of Colombia and Bolivia,
both of which recently considered adopting a cash-flow tax. Part
VI concludes the article. Part VII, Appendix A, reviews six con-
sumption-tax alternatives. Part VIII, Appendix B, discusses the
economic effects of alternative tax systems. Transition issues-
4. See Tanzi, The Response of Other Industrial Countries, supra note 3; Tanzi, Tax
Reform in Industrial Countries, supra note 3; Whalley, supra note 3.
5. For example, Representative Dick Gephardt (D.Missouri) would retain the basic
structure of the income tax, but would eliminate all personal deductions except that for
mortgage interest. The standard deduction would be $8350 for married couples, and the
personal exemption would be $2750. Although mysteriously (and misleadingly) called
the "10% Tax," the Gephardt plan would tax individual income at rates ranging from 10%
to 34%. STEPHEN J. ENTIN, GEPHARDT TAX PLAN: COMPLEX AND BIASED AGAINST SAVING
AND GROWTH, IRET CONG. ADVISORY (INSTITUTE FOR THE RESEARCH ON THE ECONOMICS
OF TAXATION, July 7, 1995). Contributions to pensions would no longer be tax-deductible
(but taxation of the build-up in pension values would still be deferred until withdrawn)
and the tax rate on capital gains would no longer be subject to a ceiling (28% at the time
of the Gephardt proposal and 20% following enactment of the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997). Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. § 311 (1997). The thrust of
these changes is diametrically opposed to that of consumption-based proposals. They
have virtually no chance of passing a Congress controlled by the Republicans.
6. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela already have a value added tax (VAT). See INTERNATIONAL
BUREAU OF FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, TAXATION OF TRANSACTIONS (1994-1997).
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some of the most complicated matters in this area and some of the
most important-are discussed briefly in Part IX, Appendix C.
II. THE PLANS
Plans for consumption-based tax reform generally fall into
two broad categories: (1) indirect or "impersonal" taxes, such as
an RST or a VAT (2) and direct or "personalized" consumption-
based taxes, which are not currently levied by any country on a
broad basis.7 Appendix A shows the relation among the various
forms of consumption-based taxes.
A. Indirect/Impersonal Consumption Taxes
Indirect taxes are levied on the supply of goods and services;
they are not levied on individuals. Accordingly, they cannot be
easily "personalized" to take into account the characteristics of
families such as family size, income, source of income, or spending
patterns.
1. Sales Tax
Congressman Bill Archer (R-Texas), Chairman of the House
Ways and Means Committee, the tax-writing committee of the
House of Representatives, has suggested that he may propose a
sales tax to replace the income tax to "tear the income tax system
out by its roots" and "get the IRS completely out of our individual
lives."8 Although Archer has not clearly indicated what kind of tax
he has in mind, it is reasonable to infer that he is thinking of an
RST. Forty-five of the fifty states and the District of Colombia
impose an RST, thus such a tax would be familiar to U.S. citizens.
Although Archer has not indicated the tax rate that would be
needed to replace the income tax, Senator Richard Lugar (R-
Indiana) has proposed a 17% RST.9 Many observers believe that a
7. The traditional distinction between indirect and direct taxes is not really satis-
factory; in some cases it becomes blurred. The distinction between personal and imper-
sonal taxes is explained below. See discussion infra Part IL.A-B. As stated infra note 12,
after this article was originally written in 1995, Croatia enacted a consumption-based tax
of a type not considered here.
8. Bill Archer, Goals of Fundamental Tax Reform, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 3,
4-5 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
9. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Fundamental Tax Reform and State and Local Govern-
[Vol. 29:1-2148
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tax rate of this level (some 17% to 25% when combined with exist-
ing sales tax rates) would be unrealistic for a single-stage RST be-
cause it creates a strong incentive to cheat. 10
2. Value Added Tax
In 1994, Senator Sam Gibbons (D-Florida), a minority mem-
ber of the House Ways and Means Committee, introduced a legis-
lative proposal for a subtraction-method VAT," commonly called a
"business transfer tax" in the United States. Senators David
Boren (D-Oklahoma) and John Danforth (R-Missouri) made simi-
lar proposals in 1995. The credit-invoice form VAT, the revenue
workhorse of the world, is notably absent from the current debate,
despite a 1994 proposal by Senator Ernest Hollings (D-South
Carolina). The credit-invoice form VAT is included here for com-
pleteness and to provide a basis for comparison.
B. Direct/Personalized Consumption-Based Taxes
Direct taxes are levied on individuals. For this reason, they
can be personalized. There are four such taxes: two "pure" forms
and two "hybrid" forms.12 The explanation as to why these taxes
are called consumption-based taxes will follow in the next section.
ments, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 475 (1996).
10. A Better Way to Pay: America's Tax Reform, ECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 1996, at 32.
11. Under a subtraction-method VAT, tax is the product of the tax rate (usually stated
on a tax-inclusive basis) and the difference between sales and purchases. By comparison,
under a credit-method tax, liability is the product of the (tax-exclusive) tax rate and sales,
minus credit for tax on purchases. In simple cases the two methods-and a retail sales tax
(RST)-give the same result. More generally they do not. See CHARLES E. McLURE, JR.,
THE VALUE ADDED TAX: KEY TO DEFICrI REDUCTION? 16-17, ch. 6 (1987). Michigan and
New Hampshire levy yet a different type of VAT; under the addition method (which is
similar to the subtraction method) components of value added (wages, profits, etc.) are
summed to derive the tax base.
12. There is actually a third pure form of consumption-based direct tax which is one
based on net cash flow from the business sector. See INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION (1978). As policymakers have shown no in-
terest in it, it is not discussed further. Since this article was originally prepared, Croatia
has enacted yet another form of tax that achieves the same objectives as a cash flow tax. It
allows a deduction for the imputed cost of equity finance. See Peter Schmidt et al., The New
Croatian Tax System, 50 BULL. INV'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 155-63 (1996).
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1. The Flat Tax
House Majority Leader Dick Armey (R-Texas) and Senator
Arlen Specter (R-Pennsylvania) have both introduced proposals for
a "flat tax."13 The prototypical flat tax that Hall and Rabushka
described 14 has four distinct and separable features: (1) separate
taxes on the labor income of individuals and the "income" of busi-
nesses; (2) distinct treatment of income from business and capital,
including a cash-flow measurement of the business tax base; (3)
virtually no personal deductions other than a tax-free amount; 5
and (4) a single tax rate of about 20% that is to be applied to the
taxable "income" of both individuals and businesses. 16 Labor in-
come, including pensions, would be subject to withholding, as un-
der the income tax. The remainder of this section focuses on the
taxation of income derived from business and capital under the
flat tax.
The key features of the business tax base are the following:
immediate deduction (expensing) for all purchases-including de-
preciable assets and additions to inventories-and labor costs; ex-
13. The Armey Bill, H.R. 4585, 103d Cong. (1994) and the Specter Bill, S. 488, 104th
Cong. (1995) differ slightly. For example, the Specter Bill, but not the Armey Bill, would
allow deductions for charitable contributions and interest on home mortgages. For further
details, see Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 104th Cong., Description and Analysis of Pro-
posals to Replace the Federal Income Tax 3-4 (Joint Comm. Print 1995) [hereinafter Joint
Comm.].
14. The prototypical flat tax was made famous by Robert E. Hall and Alvin Rabushka.
See generally ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, LOW TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX 32-67
(1983) [hereinafter Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX]; ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA,
THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter THE FLAT TAX]; Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka,
The Flat Tax: A Simple Progressive Consumption Tax, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27, 27-
53 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
15. The Armey Bill, H.R. 4585 would allow a basic standard deduction of $24,700
for a couple filing a joint return and an additional standard deduction of $5000 per de-
pendent. The comparable figures for the Specter bill are $16,500 and $4500. By com-
parison, the standard deduction under present law is $6500. There is also a personal ex-
emption of $2500 (1995 level, to be indexed for inflation) for the taxpayer, spouse, and
each dependent. In each case, the standard deduction depends on the filing status of the
taxpayer (i.e., joint return, single, etc.).
16. For more complete descriptions, see THE FLAT TAX, supra note 14, at 56-64; George
R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure, Jr., Implementing Direct Consumption Taxes in Developing
Countries, 46 TAX L. REV. 405, 410-28 (1991). CHARLES E. MCLURtE, JR. ET AL., THE
TAXATION OF INcOME FROM BuSINESS AND CAPITAL IN COLOMBIA 295, 295-351 (1990);
CHARLEs E. McLuRE, JR., ET AL., LA TRIBUTACION DE LA RENTA DE LOS NEGOcIOS Y DEL
CAPITAL EN COLOMBIA (Colombian Government trans. 1988), includes such a tax but with
graduated rates. "Income" is placed in quotations to indicate that it refers to a tax base that
is analogous to income, but different.
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clusion of interest income; and no deduction for interest expense.
The same treatment applies to interest income and expenses of
individuals. In addition, dividends and capital gains are tax-
exempt. Because of this treatment of the return to capital, this
approach is sometimes called "yield exemption treatment" (YET).17
In the Hall-Rabushka proposal, the flat tax would be levied on
a territorial basis; there would be no tax on income earned abroad
and no credit for tax paid to foreign governments.' 8 The tax would
be levied on an origin basis. Therefore, export sales would be tax-
able, and deductions would be allowed for business imports.
The flat tax can be seen as a special form of VAT in which a
business is allowed a deduction for compensation, which is then
taxed in the hands of employees. 19 This allows personalization of
the flat tax in a way that is not possible under a standard VAT.
For this reason, the U.S. Treasury Department in 1984 referred to
this tax as "a personal exemption VAT." In theory, the same ob-
jective could be achieved by combining a standard VAT with re-
fundable credits for low-income individuals. The U.S. experience
with fraudulent claims for refunds under the earned income tax
credit, however, makes this an unattractive option, even though a
similar practice apparently works in Canada.
20
2. The Consumed Income Tax
The other "pure" version of a consumption-based direct tax is
the consumed income tax (CIT).21 Under this version, payments to
17. Both the flat tax and the consumed income tax (CIT) are sometimes lumped to-
gether as "cash-flow taxes." Reflecting the fact that cash flow treatment is provided for
real assets under the flat tax, but financial flows are ignored, the U.K.'s prestigious Me-
ade Commission called the resulting tax base the R (real) base. INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL
STUDIES, supra note 12, at 230-33. By comparison, it called the CIT described below an
R+F (real plus financial) base, because debt transactions and interest flows are consid-
ered in calculating taxable cash flows. I have adopted the yield-exemption treatment
(YET)/CIT terminology to avoid potential confusion.
18. THE FLAT TAX, supra note 14, at 76.
19. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Economic, Administrative and Political Factors in
Choosing a General Consumption Tax, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 345 (1993).
20. Title X of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 renders ineligible for earned income
tax credits those who make claims for credits that are fraudulent (for ten years) or in
reckless or intentional disregard of the law (for two years). H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. §
1085 (1997).
21. See generally DAVID F. BRADFORD & THE U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 3, ch. 4 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM]; INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, supra note 12; HENRY J. AARON &
1997-98]
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labor and business purchases would be deductible as under the
flat tax. Interest income would be taxable, and interest expense
would be deductible as under the income tax. In marked contrast
to the income tax, however, both individuals and businesses would
include the proceeds of borrowing and the receipt of debt repay-
ments in their tax base and deduct lending and repayment of debt.
There is no active proposal for such a tax. It is described here
primarily to provide a benchmark for descriptions of other pro-
posals.
3. The McLure-Zodrow Hybrid
Based on work done in Bolivia during 1995, McLure and Zo-
drow have proposed a hybrid system that combines yield exemp-
tion (flat tax) treatment of individuals with CIT treatment of
business.2 2 In addition to a tax-free amount, the hybrid can ac-
commodate either a single tax rate or graduated rates on the in-
come of individuals. 23 This tax would be levied on an origin basis.
4. The Unlimited Savings Account Tax
The fourth possible variant of consumption-based direct taxa-
tion would be a hybrid that combines CIT treatment of individuals
with YET treatment of business. No such proposal currently ex-
ists. However, the Unlimited Savings Account (USA) Tax (S. 722),
proposed by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and Pete Domenici
(R-New Mexico), resembles such a hybrid.24 It combines an 11%
subtraction-method VAT on businesses with a treatment of indi-
HARvEY GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM 20-21, 25-29 (1985).
22. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to Direct Taxa-
tion of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 70, 73-84 (Michael J. Boskin ed.,
1996) [hereinafter McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach]; Charles E. McLure, Jr. &
George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-Based Direct Tax Proposed for Bolivia, 3 INT'L
TAX & PuB. FIN. 97-112 (1996) [hereinafter McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-
Based Direct Tax].
23. The same is equally true of the flat tax and the CIT.
24. See Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1485, 1523
(1995); Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analysis and Comparisons,
in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 54, 56 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996). Susan Dentzer, Trial
Balloons on Tax Reform, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 31, 1995, at 43; William
Neikirk, Bipartisan Sponsors Unveil Tax-Revamp Plan; Proposal Aims to Help Ameri-
cans Save More, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 29, 1995, at 1; Robert T. Gray, Major Proposals in Con-
gress to Overhaul the Tax System Will Set off an Extensive Debate, NATION'S BUS., Apr.
1995, at 18, available in 1995 WL 8582957.
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viduals that resembles the CIT. Under this proposal, individuals
would be allowed an unlimited deduction for savings, and reduc-
tions in net savings would be included in their tax base. Further,
proceeds of borrowing are not included in the tax base; they only
reduce deductible savings but not below zero. Moreover, con-
sumption from assets existing at the time the tax is imposed
would not be subject to tax, and the tax exempt status of interest
on state and local bonds would be preserved.
The USA tax would allow two standard deductions: a
"personal living allowance" and personal and dependent deduc-
tions for the taxpayer, spouse, and dependents. Itemized deduc-
tions would be allowed for home mortgage interest and charitable
contributions, but not for the other itemized deductions found in
current law, and for certain educational expenses. 25 Contrary to
the current practice, these deductions would be allowed in addi-
tion to the standard deductions, not in lieu of them.26
After the first year, individual tax rates would be 8%, 19%,
and 40%-the last reached by a couple filing a joint return at an
income of $24,000.27 As under current law, the individual portion
of the USA tax is levied on worldwide income, and it would allow
foreign tax credits for income taxes paid to foreign governments.
It would also allow earned income tax credit, a refundable credit
available for low income taxpayers who have earned income. In
addition, there would be a new credit for the employee portion of
payroll taxes collected to finance social security, which is currently
7.65% of the first $60,000 of annual compensation. 28 The individ-
ual credit would be refundable to the extent it exceeds liability
under the USA tax. Thus, net of the credit for payroll taxes, ag-
gregate tax rates would be 0.35%, 11.35%, and 32.35%, over the
income range covered by the credit.
29
25. The personal living allowance would be $7400 for a couple filing a joint return;
personal and dependent deductions would be $2550 for the taxpayer, spouse, and de-
pendents, comparable to the $2500 in current law. Deduction would be allowed for edu-
cational expenses of up to $2000 per year per student, for up to four students, for a total
of up to $8000.
26. I.R.C. § 63 (1997). Under current law, itemized deductions are allowed only
when they exceed the standard deduction.
27. By comparison, the current tax rates on individual income are 15%, 28%, 31%,
36%, and 39.6%; couples filing joint returns reach the last two rates at income levels of
$143,600 and $256,500, respectively. Id. § 1.
28. Id. § 3101.
29. Note, however, that for a high-income individual who does not save, the aggre-
gate marginal effective tax rate would be 46.6% (40% individual tax plus 11% business
1997-98]
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The business portion of the USA tax would be a territorial
subtraction-method VAT. Thus, there would be no foreign tax
credit. Instead, there would be border tax adjustments (BTAs),
taxation of imports, and a rebate of tax on exports, as explained
further below. 30 A credit of 7.65% would be allowed for the em-
ployer share of payroll taxes. Losses, instead of resulting in re-
funds, as when credits exceed gross tax liability under a credit-
method VAT, would be carried forward without interest. This
treatment would apply to exporters, which are commonly zero-
rated under conventional VATs.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
In general, economists have favored consumption-based taxes
because they do not distort the choice between saving and con-
sumption in favor of current consumption and against saving, as
the income tax does.3I Business prefers them for a similar reason;
they view consumption-based taxes as more favorable to capital
formation.3 2 Others emphasize the simplicity advantages of con-
sumption-based taxes.3 3 Some recent advocates of consumption-
based taxation presumably expect to pay less tax than under the
income tax. However, some possible motivations that have been
prominent in the past are notably absent from the current de-
bate.3 4
tax on after-tax income (which is 60% of before-tax income)).
30. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
31. See generally Mervyn A. King, Savings and Taxation, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
TAX SYSTEM 1, 1-35 (G.A. Hughes & G.M. Heal eds., 1980); Steven A. Bank, Origins of a
Flat Tax, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 329, 400 n.571 (1996).
32. Many see reducing the federal budget deficit (which is a form of dissaving) as a
more promising way to increase aggregate saving. GARY CLYDE HUFRAUER, FUNDAMENTAL
TAX REFORM AND BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS 3, 9-13 (1995). For a review of evidence and
literature on U.S. saving behavior, see Joint Comm., supra note 13, at 61-68.
33. See generally Zodrow & McLure, supra note 16, at 428-29; William D. Andrews,
A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1116,
1119 (1974); Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Administrative Advantages of
the Individual Tax Payment Approach to the Direct Taxation of Consumption, in
HEIDELBERG CONGRESS ON TAXING CONSUMPTION 335, 337 (1990).




1. Effects on Savings
The RST, the VAT, and the CIT, are taxes on consumption.
They apply only to sales to households (an ideal RST),35 allow a
credit for tax paid on capital goods (the VAT),36 or allow a deduc-
tion for saving (the CIT).37 In each case, the return on investment
is unaffected by taxation because the marginal effective tax rate
(METR) on income from capital is zero.38 The flat tax, and thus
the two hybrids, is equal in present value to a tax on consumption
because it is characterized by a METR of zero.39
A standard theorem in the economics of public finance states
that the METR on income from capital is zero under a consump-
tion-based tax.4° There are a number of ways to demonstrate this
proposition. One of the simplest is to consider an equity-financed
one-year investment of $100 that yields 10% in the absence of tax.
Assuming that the taxpayer has other income against which to
offset the deduction for the investment, expensing reduces taxable
income by $100. If the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer is 30%,
the investment costs the taxpayer only $70. The government ad-
vances the other $30, via reduced tax receipts. At the end of the
year the investment returns $110, which consists of principal of
$100 and the return of $10. The government takes 30%, or $33,
leaving the taxpayer with $77. The net private return to the in-
vestment, 10% ($7 as a percent of $70), is the same as in the ab-
sence of tax. Thus, the METR is zero. By comparison, the METR
under an ideal income tax equals the statutory tax rate.41 Ap-
35. In practice, the RSTs levied by the states commonly apply to a substantial
amount of investment goods. This problem could be greatly reduced if a serious effort
was made. For an explanation of the RST, see supra text accompanying notes 8-10.
36. For an explanation of the VAT, see supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
37. For an explanation of the CIT, see supra text accompanying note 21.
38. The marginal effective tax rate (METR) is the percent reduction in the before-
tax rate-of-return created by taxation; it can exceed 100%, or it can be negative.
39. See generally MCLuRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 60-64 (containing an introduc-
tory discussion of METR).
40. Arnold C. Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in THE ECO-
NOMICS OF TAXATION 299, 299-313 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin, eds., 1980). See
generally McLuRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 60-64.
41. In this case, the investment is written off in the second year via depreciation.
Thus, the taxpayer's private investment is the full $100, before-tax income is $10 ($110
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pendix B provides further numerical examples of the economic ef-
fects of the YET, the CIT, and a tax on economic income.
The METR is zero under a tax on consumption; therefore,
such a tax is neutral with regard to whether to consume now or to
save now and consume later. By comparison, an income tax penal-
izes savings by reducing the return on savings. Stated differently,
a consumption-based tax, with its METR of zero, is more condu-
cive to saving and investment than an income tax.42. As a result, it
is expected that economic growth would be more rapid under a
consumption-based tax than under the income tax. Jorgenson es-
timates that movement to a consumption-based tax in 1986, in-
stead of reform of the income tax, would have produced twice as
many opportunities for new economic growth as the 1986 Act did,
which he places at one trillion dollars. 43 Kotlikoff,44 on the other
hand, estimates an 8% increase in the level of output if a con-
sumption tax were substituted for the income tax or a 6% increase
if payments are made to the elderly to compensate them for lump-
sum losses created by the shift.45
2. Uniformity of Consumption-Based Taxation
The primary objective of the tax reform exercise that culmi-
nated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was to tax all real economic
income uniformly and consistently.46 While substantial progress
gross receipts minus $100 depreciation), tax is $3 (30% of $10), and net income is $7. As
taxation reduces the return from 10% to 7% ($7 as a percent of $100), the METR is 30%.
42. Strictly speaking, consumption-based taxation may not encourage greater sav-
ings, even though, unlike the income tax, it is neutral with regard to the choice between
current and future consumption. For a simple explanation of this point, which is ignored
in what follows, see Charles E. McLure, Jr., Taxes, Saving, and Welfare" Theory and
Evidence, 33 NAT'L TAx J. 311, 311-20 (1980). If those saving for retirement are "target
savers" who want to be able to accumulate a "nest egg" of a given size in order to be able
to finance a target level of consumption during retirement, an increase in the rate of re-
turn may actually lead to a reduction in saving. On the other hand, the lump-sum taxa-
tion of existing wealth represented by a consumption-based tax with no transition relief
(discussed below) would spur such individuals to increase saving.
43. Dale W. Jorgenson, The Economic Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform, in
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 181, 183-86 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
44. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Saving and Consumption Taxation: The Federal Retail
Sales Tax Example, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 160, 177-78 (Michael J. Boskin ed.,
1996).
45. For alternative estimates of these effects, see Alan J. Auerbach, Tax Reform,
Capital Allocation, Efficiency, and Growth, in ECONOMIc EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX
REFORM 29, 30 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996).
46. The U.S. Department of Treasury does not state this objective in these words.
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was clearly achieved on that score, it is also clear that total suc-
cess is impossible. As Michael J. Boskin notes, "measuring income
is a severe, probably insurmountable problem."47 It is certainly
complicated.
If an income tax is to be fair and economically neutral, the
measure of income for tax purposes must track economic income
fairly closely.48 Otherwise, there will be inequities and distortions
of economic decisions. In order to measure income accurately, it is
necessary to deal satisfactorily with issues of timing-namely,
deciding when to recognize income and when to allow deductions.
Depreciation is perhaps the most obvious example of a timing is-
sue. If depreciation allowances are too generous, income is under-
stated, but if the allowances are not generous enough, income is
overstated. Other examples of thorny timing issues include the
capitalization of inventory costs, original issue discount, and
multi-year production. Some of these issues are conceptually and
technically simple, but difficult in practice, such as original issue
discount. Others are impossible in practice, such as knowing the
rate of economic depreciation and the rate at which income is cre-
ated in multi-year projects. Thus, METRs inevitably vary across
assets, methods of finance, and patterns of ownership, and there-
fore across industries.
Consumption-based taxes allow for the expensing of business
purchases (or its equivalent, as under the credit-method VAT), so
timing issues cannot arise. The METR under a consumption-
based tax is identically zero unless intentional deviations are leg-
islated. The treatment of interest under the YET, which is neither
taxable nor deductible, implies that timing issues, such as original
issue discount, do not arise in that sphere. Similarly, but less ob-
viously, under the CIT the inclusion of the proceeds of borrowing
is completely offset by deductions for payments of principal and
interest.
TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at vii, 13. I developed this formulation during
the period following that report. See Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George R. Zodrow, Treas-
ury.1 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986: The Economics and Politics of Tax Reform, 1 J.
ECON. PERSP. 37, 38-39 (1987).
47. Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Evaluation of the Political Discourse on
Fundamental Tax Reform Proposals, paper presented to a conference on Fundamental
Tax Reform organized by the Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford California
14 (Dec. 1, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review).
48. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Lessons for LDCs of U.S. Income Tax Re-
form, in TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 347, 347-90 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989).
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Inflation further complicates the task of measuring income
accurately. First, in the absence of inflation adjustment of the
value of assets, tax is levied on capital gains that are not real, and
real losses are understated. Similarly, deductions for cost of goods
sold from inventories and depreciation allowance do not allow re-
covery of costs. Second, nominal interest income is taxed and
nominal interest expense is deductible without recognition of the
inflation-induced reduction in the real value of indebtedness.
Therefore, failure to adequately address inflation creates inequi-
ties and distortions. However, inflation adjustment creates added
complexity, even under a relatively "clean" method of the type
used in Chile and Colombia.49 Consumption-based taxation avoids
these problems because it is based on cash flow.
B. Simplicity
Some consumption-based direct taxes are inherently simpler
than income-based taxes. This is explained in the second part of
this subsection. First, it will be useful to dispose of other tangen-
tial issues of simplicity related to the flat tax.
1. Simplicity of the Flat Tax
Advocates of the flat tax claim that it is so simple that tax re-
turns would fit on a postcard.50 The flat tax's simplicity has begun
to capture the imagination of both the American public and law-
makers. People are tired of and angry about the complexity of the
present income tax.51
49. In this method, adjustments are made to the entire balance sheet and profit and
loss statement to produce an inflation-adjusted measure of both net income and net
wealth. See McLuRE ET AL., supra note 16, at 189-94. For a simplified exposition, see
Arnold C. Harberger, Comments to Daniel Halperin and Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the
Tax System for Inflation, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-
CONSUMIION TAX 380, 380-83 (Henry J. Aaron et al., eds. 1988).
50. Low TAx, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX, supra note 14, at 35; THE FLAT TAX, supra
note 14, at 45-46; Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar, 29
CON. L. REv. 9, 20 (1996); Richard Shelby, Sen. Shelby Continues to Fight for Broad-
Based Tax Reform, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS RELEASES, July 21, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File; Neil A. Lewis, Flat Tax, Once Obscure Idea, Is Set to Enter
Campaign Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, at 7.
51. Marsha Blumenthal and Joel Slemrod have estimated that individual taxpayers
devote an average of 27.4 hours to tax matters annually. Marsha Blumenthal & Joel Slemo
rod, The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax System:' A Second Look After
Tax Reform, 45 NA 'IL TAX J. 185, 185-202 (1992). They estimate the aggregate cost in time
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The flat tax for individuals derives its claim to simplicity from
the interaction of three of the features described above. First, only
labor income would be reported on individual tax returns; divi-
dends and interest income would be exempt, interest expense
would not be deductible, and business "income" would be reported
on a separate form.52 Additionally, there would be no personal de-
ductions except as needed to provide a tax-free amount.53 Finally,
all taxable income would be taxed at the same rate, and this rate
would apply to both businesses and individuals.
54
Without gainsaying the simplicity advantages of the flat tax,
it should be noted that most of these advantages could be achieved
in an income tax. Most taxpayers do not currently have business
income; personal deductions could be eliminated, or at least se-
verely limited, and there could be a single rate. In short, for indi-
vidual taxpayers with no business income and no income from in-
terest or dividends, it would be easy to fit tax returns on a
postcard. Indeed, while Form 1040EZ is not printed on a postcard,
it probably could be, especially if fewer deductions were available
to those who use it. Conversely, there is no reason-aside from
the name-that the flat tax could not allow personal deductions
and graduated rates. Indeed, in the debate preceding the enact-
ment of the 1986 Reform, there was discussion of a "modified flat
tax."5
5
The flat tax does, however, exhibit aspects of simplicity that
income taxation does not have. These aspects involve the taxation
of income from business and capital, the exemption of interest and
dividends, the disallowance of deductions for interest expense, and
the measurement of business income. It is useful to distinguish
the simplicity benefits of the "yield exemption" approach of the flat
tax from the aspects of simplicity discussed above.
and money to be between 5% and 7% of total revenue collected from individual income
taxes. Id. Blumenthal and Slemrod combine these figures with estimates of costs of the
corporate income tax, concluding that total costs of compliance and administration may be
as much as $75 billion annually, or 10% of total revenue from federal and state income
taxes. See Joel Slemrod, Which is the Simplest Tax System of them all?, in ECONOMIc
EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 355, 355-91 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale
eds. 1996).
52. THE FLAT TAX, supra note 14, at 45-46.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, supra note 2, at 23-29; Editorial, A Flat Tax That
America Might Buy, Bus. WK., June 12, 1995, at 110; Charlotte Saikowski, Reagan
Makes His Pitch for Tax Overhaul, Touts GOP for Proposing It, CHRISTIAN ScL MONITOR,
July 11, 1986, at 3.
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2. Inherent Simplicity of Consumption-Based Taxes
Because of the difficulties inherent in solving the problems of
timing described above, an income tax is inherently complicated.
It is especially complicated in a world of rapid inflation. In 1988, I
wrote the following in an article whose subtitle asked whether the
1986 Act was tax reform's finest hour or the death throes of the
income tax: "we may have shown definitively that attempting to
implement a conceptually correct income tax (even one without
inflation adjustment) is impracticable."56
As indicated above, some forms of consumption-based direct
taxation are inherently simpler than an income tax, especially in
an inflationary environment. 57 Because tax liability is based on
cash flow, timing issues cannot arise, and there is no need for in-
flation adjustment.
3. Relative Simplicity of Yield Exemption Treatment and
Consumed Income Tax58
The YET version of consumption-based direct taxation is con-
siderably simpler than the CIT version, especially for individuals.
Individuals are not required to report interest, dividends, or capi-
tal gains, and the tax administration is not required to ensure that
they do.59 By comparison, under the CIT, individuals must keep
records of saving and dissaving.60 The CIT would thus be even
more complicated and more difficult to administer than the in-
come tax for individuals. It would be difficult to prevent taxpayers
from borrowing abroad and taking a deduction under the CIT for
amounts apparently saved.
56. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The 1986 Act. Tax Reform's Finest Hour or Death
Throes of the Income Tax?, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 303 (1988).
57. For further explanation, see generally McLure, supra note 56; Zodrow &
McLure, supra note 16. For analysis of the comparative simplicity of the flat tax and a
conventional income tax, see Joel Slemrod, What Makes Some Consumption Taxes So
Simple and Others So Complicated?, paper presented to a conference on Fundamental
Tax Reform organized by the Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford California 2
(Dec. 1, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Simplicity of the Flat Tar Is it
Unique?, 14 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y (forthcoming Fall 1997).
58. This section draws on McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach, supra note 22, at
70-90.




Despite the simplicity advantages of YET treatment of indi-
viduals, application of YET to businesses would create or accentu-
ate several problems. First, because of its treatment of interest, it
would exempt the margin and thus the profits of financial inter-
mediaries. 6' This treatment may not be politically acceptable, and
measures to deal with the problem may be complicated and would
undermine the objective of consumption-based taxation.
Second, losses reported for tax purposes under the YET would
be much greater than under the CIT, which includes the proceeds
of borrowing in the tax base. It would be necessary to carry losses
forward with interest in order to preserve their value.6 2 Other-
wise, new businesses would be at a disadvantage and there would
be incentives for mergers and acquisitions motivated by tax sav-
ings.
Finally, under the YET there would be opportunities for abu-
sive transactions between businesses and persons not subject to
tax, including foreigners and non-profit organizations. For exam-
ple, a taxable firm might sell at below-market prices in exchange
for an above market interest rate on installment debt.
4. Simplicity of the Hybrid Consumption-Based Direct Tax
Given the complexity of the CIT for individual taxpayers, the
disadvantages of applying YET treatment to business, and the fact
that businesses could generally handle the complexities of the
CIT, McLure and Zodrow propose a hybrid where YET treatment
is applied to individuals but CIT treatment is applied to busi-
nesses.6 3 Some problems remain, but these are thought to be less
significant than those under either of the pure forms of consump-
tion-based direct tax-and a fortiori less significant than those
under the other hybrid: YET for business and CIT for individuals,
or the USA tax.
61. The Joint Committee on Taxation notes that, as drafted, the flat tax appears to
apply tax to interest income of financial intermediaries, while allowing no deduction for
interest expense. Joint Comm., supra note 13, at 33. As noted, this is probably unin-
tended. It appears more likely that the intent is to exempt the financial sector. For fur-
ther discussion of the taxation of financial services, see id. and references cited therein.
62. The interest rate used would be the rate on 3-month Treasury bills. See id.
63. See McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach, supra note 22, at 72-73, 84; McLure
& Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-Based Direct Tax, supra note 22, at 97-112.
1997-98]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
5. Complexity of the Unlimited Savings Account Tax
Instead of following standard CIT treatment of individuals--
with taxation of interest income and the proceeds of borrowing
and deduction of interest expense and the principal of lending-
the USA tax provides a deduction for net saving by individuals.
64
While the term "net saving" may sound like the excess of saving
over borrowing, the concept in the USA tax is much more compli-
cated than that. This complexity derives from the desire to pre-
vent the taxation of consumption financed by drawing down assets
owned at the time the USA tax is implemented and the desire to
maintain the advantage currently enjoyed by tax exempt bonds is-
sued by state and local governments (plus, apparently, the desire
to avoid the politically sensitive issue of including the proceeds of
borrowing in the tax base). "The idea here is that savings [derived
from nontaxable funds] should not be deductible ... , but later con-
sumption attributable to such funds should be tax-free."
65
The USA tax will probably not be enacted due to its complex-
ity and other flaws.66 Accordingly, for the purposes of this article,
it is unnecessary to subject the audience to a lengthy exposition of
its arcane rules; a few examples will indicate the nature of the
problem. 67 First, the transition provisions intended to prevent the
taxation of amounts already taxed under the income tax actually
benefit only dissavers, not savers. Second, the intended exemp-
tion of interest from state and local securities also only benefits
dissavers. These features are hardly consistent with the purpose
of the USA tax-namely, to eliminate the income tax bias against
saving. And, of course, these features will lead to manipulation,
which implies even more complexities.
For example, Ginsburg notes "everyone decently wealthy will
be a net saver in some (perhaps odd-numbered) years and a net
64. See Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, supra note 24, at 1514;
Weidenbaum, supra note 24, at 56.
65. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Proposal for an "Unlimited Saving Allowance", 68 TAX
NOTES 1103, 1105 (1995).
66. "The legislation seems unlikely of enactment, surely unlikely of enactment in
the form introduced ... " Martin Ginsburg, Life Under a Personal Consumption Tax:
Some Thoughts on Working, Saving, and Consuming in Nunn-Domenici's World, 48
NATOL TAX J. 585, 585 (1995).
67. These examples come from the work of Alvin C. Warren. See Warren, supra
note 65, at 1105.
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dissaver in other years."68 Anti-abuse rules are included to pre-
vent these and other "games," but "anti-abuse rules of this sort
suggest, not that the problems are thereby solved, but rather that
there are basic flaws in the Unlimited Savings Allowance."6 9 War-
ren concludes, and Ginsburg concurs, "tilt would be much simpler




One of the Achilles' heels of consumption-based taxation has
traditionally been its distributional effects; taxes on consumption
tend to be regressive. 7" Because the percentage of income con-
sumed falls as income increases, the percentage of income paid
in taxes falls as income rises. In the case of indirect taxes on
consumption, regressivity can be avoided by introducing exemp-
tions for necessities and higher rates on "luxuries." However,
this is done only at the cost of substantial complexities of ad-
ministration and compliance, economic distortions, horizontal
inequities, and higher rates. After all, in aggregate, the non-
poor consume more of such goods than do the poor. Accordingly,
it is especially difficult to use this approach to achieve progres-
sivity in the upper income levels.
Direct consumption-based taxes can, in principle, use tax
thresholds and graduated rates to avoid regressivity. This is the
purpose of the structure of a flat tax; unlike a standard VAT, it
allows a personal exemption. Indeed, with the proper structure
68. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 588. See also Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-
Enactment Basis Under a Consumption Tax. The USA Tax System, 68 TAX NOTES 1109,
1110-11 (1995).
69. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 590.
70. The alternative mentioned in the last sentence is what we have called the CIT.
See Warren, supra note 65, at 1108. Regarding the transition provisions, Ginsburg con-
cludes:
In any event, a cash flow consumption tax that (1) includes borrowed
amounts in the tax base and (2) does not hold the recovery of pre-enactment
basis hostage to taxpayers' post-enactment conduct, may not solve all the
problems and eliminate all the opportunities real life and the tax bar can
produce-the rich will persevere-but it will perform measurably better the
task to which the Nunn-Domenici proposals are addressed.
Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 598.
71. Another potential problem is the interaction of a federal tax on consumption
and state RSTs. It is not discussed here because it is a problem primarily for the VAT
(and perhaps the RST). Cf., MCLURE, supra note 11, at 152-57.
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of graduated tax rates, it may be possible to levy a consumption-
based direct tax that is no less progressive than the income tax.
The current debate seems to be turning this distributional
concern on its head. Many current advocates of the flat tax are
high-income individuals who probably expect to pay substan-
tially less tax than under the current income tax.72 Whereas
highly graduated rates would be required under a consumption-
based tax, to achieve the current level of progressivity, applica-
tion of flat rates would guarantee regressivity.
The U.S. Treasury Department has estimated that, in a
revenue-neutral tax reform, the bottom 80% of households would
be required to pay more taxes to compensate for the tax reduc-
tion enjoyed by the more affluent.78 It estimates that under a
22.9% flat tax of the type proposed by Armey, the bottom four
quintiles would pay from 8.3% to 12.2% more taxes than they do
under the current law, while the top quintile would pay 5.6% less
tax.74 The 5% of households with the highest incomes would pay
19.2% less tax and the top 1% would pay 33.2% less tax.75 Once
the public becomes aware of this, support for the flat tax may
diminish. 76 Whether support can be salvaged by substituting
graduated rates remains to be seen.
By comparison, the 46.6% top effective tax rate under the
USA tax, reached at an income level of $41,600 by a family of
four, implies more progressivity at a lower level of income than
under current law. This casts doubt on its political feasibility.
These incidence figures implicitly assume that the flat tax
has always been in existence, instead of the income tax. Thus,
they neglect transition effects. In the absence of transition rules
72. Steve Goldstein, Forbes to Quit Campaign Today, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
NC), Mar. 14, 1996, at Al; Designing Taxes to Push Growth Sounds Good, but Raises
Problems: First, Would it Work? And Second, What About Fairness?, BUFFALO NEWS,
Feb. 16, 1996, at 2C.
73. See Tax Code Revisions: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
Dept. of Treasury), available in 1995 WL 357674 [hereinafter Hearings].
74. Id.
75. Id. These estimates are based on annual flows of income and consumption.
Estimates in which taxation is related to lifetime income are much less regressive. See
also DON FULLERTON & DIANE LiM ROGERS, WHO BEARS THE LIFETIME BURDEN? 161, 171-
74 (1993).
76. This effect was a major "lightning rod" drawing criticism to Steve Forbes, a
wealthy publisher who based his unsuccessful candidacy for the Republican nomination
for president in 1996 on his advocacy of the flat tax.
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to prevent it, a consumption tax would represent a lump-sum tax
on "old capital"-capital existing at the time of enactment. This
is most easily seen in the case of wealth that is fixed in nominal
terms and an RST that is reflected in higher prices. The fixed
nominal wealth would finance lower consumption with higher
prices. More generally, the flat tax is commonly characterized as
a tax on labor income, above-normal profits, and quasi-rents,
which is the return to old capital.
The lump-sum tax on old capital is one of the reasons for the
great efficiency benefits of consumption-based taxation. Taxing
old capital avoids the burden of higher tax rates needed under a
consumption-based tax that provides transition relief.77 Thus,
replacing the income tax with a consumption-based tax, minus
transition relief, is often viewed as representing redistribution
from the older generation, who will pay most of the lump-sum
tax on old capital, to the younger generation, who will benefit
from the greater economic efficiency under the consumption-
based tax.
Gentry and Hubbard have attempted to assess the accuracy
of this last characterization by examining the bases of taxation
more carefully and determining who owns old capital. 78 They
remind us of the following points: a) much of the return to capi-
tal would be taxed under the cash-flow tax and only the "normal"
return would effectively be exempt and b) much of the income
from capital escapes tax under current law.79 Households
headed by people age fifty-five or older own just over half the net
wealth of all households,80 but this is not the end of the story.
For example, they would be hurt disproportionately because of
77. Lawrence J. Kotlikoff finds an increase in long-run output of 8% from replacing
the income tax with a RST if there is no transition relief, but 6% if relief is provided.
Kotlikoff, supra note 44, at 176-78.
78. See generally William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Distributional Implica-
tions of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
1, 1-47 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997).
79. William M. Gentry and R. Glenn Hubbard suggest dividing the ex post return to
capital into four components: the opportunity cost of capital (the return to waiting); the
risk premium; economic profit; and the difference between expectations and realizations
("luck"). Id. Roger H. Gordon and Joel Slemrod found that in 1983 substituting cash-
flow taxation for income taxation of financial assets would have increased tax revenues
slightly. Roger H. Gordon & Joel Slemrod, Do We Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capi-
tal Income, in TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 89, 105 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1988).
Of course, 1983 was just before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (which was motivated in part
precisely by such findings) reduced the problem markedly.
80. Gentry & Hubbard, supra note 78, at 16.
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their relatively large ownership of financial assets.
Gentry and Hubbard also find a distributional picture
somewhat at odds with the one described above."' First, losses to
owners of existing assets would be concentrated in households
with high income and high net wealth. Second, assets with high,
above-normal returns are also concentrated in households with
high income and high net wealth, as are assets favored by pref-
erential treatment under the current tax system. Taken to-
gether, these considerations suggest that the flat tax would be
more progressive than estimates that neglect transition effects
suggest.
D. Currently Inapplicable Motivations
A VAT, or other form of sales tax, has sometimes been advo-
cated as a means of reducing the budget deficit of the federal
government.8 2 As such, it would provide a source of additional
revenue and might replace some revenue from the income tax.
This reasoning appears to be almost completely absent from the
current tax reform debate. Hufbauer notes, "[flew if any TBA
[tax on business activity] advocates suggest that a tax on busi-
ness activity should be added to the existing tax structure."
S3
The Republican majority is intent on achieving a balanced
budget by reducing spending rather than by raising taxes.
Moreover, they probably fear that the VAT, once enacted, would
become a "money machine," financing future growth of the fed-
eral government. Finally, adding a VAT to the fiscal arsenal of
the federal government, without eliminating the income tax,
would add substantially to administrative and compliance costs.
.The VAT has also been proposed as a means of financing re-
form of health care in the United States.8 4 This idea also seems
to be dead for now, or at least dormant, a casualty of the battle
over health care reform.
81. Id. at 17.
82. See MCLURE, supra note 11, at 3.
83. HUFBAUER, supra note 32, at 10.
84. Charles L. Schultze, Paying the Bills, in SETTING DOMESTIC PRIORITIES 295,




Until recently, U.S. debate on tax reform has been conducted
as though the United States were a "closed" economy-especially
one closed to international trade and capital flows.85 This de-
scription is still largely accurate of popular debate. In reality, of
course, the enactment of a consumption tax would have impor-
tant international consequences, including particularly impor-
tant ramifications for U.S. trading partners. This section de-
scribes some of these consequences.
A. Prices, Border Tax Adjustments, and Effects on
Trade
In order to examine the effects on prices, exchange rates,
and international trade of substituting a consumption-based tax
for the income tax, it is useful to consider separately the follow-
ing: first, eliminating a uniform income tax and introducing a
uniform consumption-based tax; second, introducing BTAs; and,
finally, taking account of non-neutralities in the income tax.
1. Price Effects of Uniform Taxes
Considered separately, a tax increase reduces real after-tax
incomes, and a tax reduction increases them. But a reduction
(an increase) in factor incomes can be achieved by an increase
(reduction) in prices, with nominal incomes remaining constant
or by a reduction (an increase) in nominal incomes, with prices
remaining constant (or by other equivalent changes). Ignoring
for the moment the influence of international trade, the question
is, what is the most likely response to substitution of a con-
sumption-based tax for the income tax?
85. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., International Considerations in U.S. Tax Reform, in
INFLUENCE OF TAX DIFFERENTIALS ON INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 3, 3-4 (1990);
Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Political Economy of Tax Reforms and Their Implications for
Interdependence: United States, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAX REFORM 97, 97-115




It is commonly assumed that an RST or a VAT would be re-
flected in higher prices instead of lower nominal returns to fac-
tors-essentially wages. It is hard to imagine the monetary
authorities not accommodating such an increase in prices, given
the downward rigidity of wages. This is especially so in union-
ized sectors; the alternative would presumably be substantial
unemployment.8 6 The predominance of international experience
supports these theoretical conclusions.
8 7
b. Income Tax
By comparison, the elimination of the income tax probably
would not have much effect on either before-tax factor incomes or
product prices. Thus, substituting one of the indirect taxes for
the income tax would probably result in an increase in product
prices, little change in before-tax factor returns, and an increase
in nominal after-tax returns.
c. Flat Tax and the McLure-Zodrow Hybrid
Adjustment to the flat tax would presumably resemble the
adjustments to an income tax: neither the price level nor before-
tax income would be affected. Thus, substituting it for an in-
come tax would have no effect on the price level and either before
or after-tax factor incomes. Similar results appear likely for the
McLure-Zodrow hybrid.
d. Unlimited Savings Account Tax
The results under the business portion of the USA tax are
more difficult to predict. The individual portion would probably
86. For a similar view, see Robert Hall, The International Consequences of the
Leading Tax Proposals, paper presented to a conference on Fundamental Tax Reform
organized by the Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford California 9-10 (Dec. 1,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review). Auerbach suggests that it is inappropriate to prejudge this issue. Auerbach,
supra note 45, at 54 n.43.




have effects similar to those assumed for the flat tax and the
McLure-Zodrow hybrid. The basic business tax is an 11% sub-
traction-method VAT, so it should have effects similar to those of
the RST and the standard VAT. Whether the credit for the pay-
roll tax would offset part of this effect is unclear. The analysis
that follows (as summarized in Tables 1 and 3) assumes that it
would not.
TABLE 1
Probable Effects of Tax Reform
on Factor Incomes and Product Prices
Nominal After-Tax Product Real
Wages Wages Prices Wages
Eliminate income tax 0 + 0 +
Introduce another tax:
VAT or RST/USA tax 0 0 +
Flat tax/M-Z hybrid 0 - 0
Net effect
VAT or RSTfUSA tax 0 + + 0
Flat tax M-Z hybrid 0 0 0 0
2. Border Tax Adjustments of Uniform Taxes
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
indirect taxes can be levied on either an origin or destination
basis. That is, products entering international trade can bear ei-
ther the tax of the country of origin or the tax of the country of
destination.88 An RST is inherently a destination-based tax, ex-
88. Implicit in this description is the assumption that products will be treated con-
sistently by the importing and exporting countries. If not, they will be subject to double
taxation (origin taxation in the exporting country and destination taxation in the import-
ing country) or no taxation (destination taxation in the exporting country and origin
taxation in importing country). This is not the issue here. The intent is merely to indi-
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cept to the extent that sales to tourists and to businesses produc-
ing for export are taxed. Tax is collected on retail sales of im-
ports, but not on exports. In order for a VAT to be levied on a
destination basis, tax must first be levied on imports, with no
credit for tax paid to the country of origin (no deduction for im-
ports, in the case of a subtraction-based system) and, second, tax
must not be collected on exports, and any tax collected at prior
stages must be rebated (deduction must be allowed for costs in-
curred in earlier stages, under a subtraction-based tax). The
collection of taxes on imports and rebate of taxes on exports is
commonly called BTAs. BTAs are needed to convert a destina-
tion principle tax to an origin principle tax. BTAs are not al-
lowed for direct taxes such as income taxes and payroll taxes.
In theory, in the long run and under certain conditions, the
choice of origin and destination principles is a matter of indiffer-
ence. 89 A shift from one principle to the other would be offset by
movements in exchange rates or domestic price levels. (The
trade effects of the destination principle are thus equivalent to
those of the origin principle, plus devaluation.) Of course, such
adjustments take time, during which, all else equal, the destina-
tion principle would be more favorable to trade than the origin
principle. Virtually all countries that impose a VAT employ the
destination basis. There is no need to discuss the principles in
detail because the United States would presumably do the same
and the RST is inherently a destination-based tax.
The authors of the flat tax and the McLure-Zodrow hybrid
propose that the tax should be levied on an origin basis.90 By
cats what the two systems mean. See Joint Comm., supra note 13, at 68-71; HUFBAUER,
supra note 32, at 47-70 (providing a detailed analysis of the interpretations given to these
GATT rules). Hufbauer concludes that the GATT is an evolutionary document and that
border tax adjustments (BTAs) may be allowed for direct taxes for imports of goods, but
probably not for exports, that symmetry is not required in the treatment of imports and
exports, and that BTAs may be allowed for direct taxes for both imports and exports of
services.
89. This proposition was first demonstrated in a 1953 report of the European Iron
and Steel Commission. More recent and more sophisticated demonstrations include
Harry G. Johnson & Melvyn B. Krauss, Border Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments, Com-
parative Advantage, and the Balance of Payments, 3 CAN. J. ECON. 595, 597-98 (1970);
Arnold C. Harberger, The Trade Effects of Alternative Tax Systems, reprinted in
TAXATION AND WELFARE 245, 246, 252 (1974); Arnold C. Harberger, Short-Run Effects of
Border-Tax Adjustments, reprinted in TAXATION AND WELFARE 258-75 (1974); Martin
Feldstein & Paul Krugman, International Trade Effects of Value-Added Taxation, in
TAXATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 263, 270 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
90. For a discussion on the flat tax, see Hall, aupra note 86, at 3. For a discussion
on the McLure-Zodrow Hybrid Method, see McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach, supra
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comparison, the proposal for the USA tax includes BTAs. Both
of these proposals, in different ways, are problematic.
a. Flat Tax and the McLure-Zodrow Hybrid
Under any origin-based tax, including the flat tax and the
McLure-Zodrow hybrid, there would be tremendous pressure on
transfer pricing. Specifically, firms would want to attribute as
much value added as possible to foreign countries, in order to
avoid paying tax on value added in the United States.
To avoid this problem, consideration might be given to im-
posing these taxes on a destination basis. However, direct taxes
are not eligible for BTAs under the GATT.91 Thus, it is unclear
whether this option is available. Hufbauer argues that, under
present interpretation of the GATT, BTAs are unlikely to be al-
lowed for the flat tax, but speculates that the GATT might be
amended to allow BTAs as an accommodation to the United
States.
92
b. Unlimited Savings Account Tax
It is unclear whether the USA tax would be eligible for BTAs
because of the credit for payroll tax. It can be argued that the
USA tax is an attempt to gain BTAs for the payroll taxes-for
which BTAs are not allowed.93 Hufbauer states:
[w]e conclude that, under current GATT rules, the USA Tax
can be adjusted at the border. But it is not an open-and-shut
case. In particular, a technical question can be raised as to
whether the USA Tax is a product tax, and a more substantial
note 22, at 73-84.
91. Christian Pitschas, GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the Pro-
posed European Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy,
24 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 479, 485 (citing interpretative note to the "Agreement on In-
terpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXXIII of the GAT'I", 26 B.I.S.D.,
26th Supp., 56, 82 (1978-79)).
92. HUFBAUER, supra note 32, at 68-70.
93. The argument in HUFBAUER, supra note 32, at 68, that the credit for the 7.65%
payroll tax on employers is tantamount to earmarking part of revenues for the social se-
curity trust funds is not totally convincing. There is no doubt that BTAs would be al-
lowed for the USA Tax if the payroll tax were repealed and revenues from the USA Tax
were earmarked for the trust funds. This is not what is proposed. Cosmetics are very
important in this business.
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question can be raised concerning the USA Tax treatment of
the Social Security Tax.
94
The first three columns of Table 2 show, for various taxes
assumed to replace the income tax, the tendencies for move-
ments of domestic prices (from Table 1), import prices, and ex-
port prices induced by various combinations of taxes and BTAs,
ignoring the restraining influence of international trade. Based
on these tendencies, one can infer pressures on the U.S. ex-
change rate, shown in the last column.95
TABLE 2
Probable Effects of Tax Reform and Border Tax
Adjustments on Prices and Exchange Rates
Effect on Effect on Effect on Effect on
Domestic Import Export Exchange
Prices Prices Prices Rate
Income tax replaced by:
RSTorVAT + + 0 0
USA tax
Destination-based + + 0 0
Origin-based + 0 + -
Flat tax/M-Z hybrid
Destination-based 0 + +
Origin-based 0 0 0 0
A destination-based tax that raises domestic prices, such as
the RST or VAT, also raises import prices and leaves export
94. HUIBAUER, supra note 32, at 2.
95. For a similar exercise, see Hall, supra note 86.
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prices unaffected. Similarly, an origin-based tax that does not
raise domestic prices, such as the flat tax or the McLure-Zodrow
hybrid, leaves import and export prices unchanged. In either of
these cases there would be little immediate impact on interna-
tional trade and little effect on the exchange rate. By compari-
son, if the flat tax or the McLure-Zodrow hybrid were imposed on
a destination basis, import prices would rise in relation to do-
mestic prices, and export prices would fall. This would provide a
short-run stimulus to exports, and an impediment to imports,
and would lead to an appreciation of the dollar. Conversely, if
the USA tax were levied without BTAs, both the prices of do-
mestic goods and exports would rise, but the price of imports
would not change. The resulting difficulties in competing in both
domestic and foreign markets would lead to a depreciation of the
dollar.
3. Other Considerations
Up to this point, the discussion has assumed that a neutral
income tax would be replaced by a neutral tax on consumption.
In fact, this is not the case. At the very least, the existing in-
come tax is not neutral; it applies more heavily to capital-
intensive goods than to labor-intensive ones. 96 Whether the tax
replacing it would replicate these differentials, be more neutral,
or impose yet another set of differentials, remains to be seen.
Shifts in burdens between the tradable and non-tradable sectors
would alter the neutrality results described above.
If substitution of a cash-flow tax for the income tax were to
increase saving more (less) than investment, it would cause a
temporary improvement (deterioration) in the trade balance.
97
Of course, this would eventually be reversed.
The transitional impact of a consumption-based tax would
depend crucially on whether it was levied on an origin or desti-
96. Leslie B. Samuels suggests that there would be little effect on competitiveness
from this source. See Hearings, supra note 73. Feldstein and Krugman concentrate on
the other side of the replacement, the possibility that the VAT would not be neutral.
Feldstein & Krugman, supra note 89, at 264-65, 275-77.
97. National accounting provides the following identity:
C + S + (r - G) = C+I + (X -M),
where C is consumption, S is saving, (T -G) is the budget surplus (taxes minus govern-
ment spending), I is investment, and (X - M) is the trade surplus (exports minus im-
ports). All else equal, if S - I increases, the trade surplus must increase.
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nation basis. If levied on a destination basis, such a tax would
burden U.S. owners of capital located both in the United States
and abroad but not foreign investors in the United States. On
the other hand, an origin-basis tax would burden both resident
and foreign investors in the United States but not U.S. residents
investing abroad.
B. Location of Economic Activity
1. Outbound U.S. Investment
Both the flat tax and the USA tax are levied on a territorial
basis. They do not apply to income earned abroad by U.S. corpo-
rations. By comparison, under the current law, U.S. tax is paid
on worldwide income, and credit is allowed for income tax paid to
the country where income originates, up to the level of U.S. tax
that would be due on such foreign-source income. 98 This has led
some observers to believe that the flat tax and U.S. tax would cre-
ate an incentive for investment to shift from the United States to
other countries that levy lower taxes-the "runaway plant" prob-
lem. Hufbauer characterizes this as "a near fatal objection."99
This view reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the
nature of consumption-based taxes. 100 As noted earlier, a con-
sumption-based tax exempts the normal return to capital, but
not the above-normal return. Thus, a foreign country would not
be more attractive than the United States to an investor in a
project yielding only a normal rate of return as long as its tax
rate was positive. Whether it would be attractive for an invest-
ment yielding an above-normal return depends on the relation
between the tax rates of the two countries and the fraction of to-
tal returns represented by normal returns.' 0 ' The higher the
98. I.R.C. § 901 (1997).
99. HUFBAUER, supra note 32, at 68.
100. This discussion draws heavily on Harry Grubert & Scott Newlon, International
Aspects of Consumption Taxes, 48 NATL TAx J. 619, 624 (1995).
101. Assuming all returns to be distributed immediately, the U.S. consumption-




where U is the tax rate in the United States, F is the foreign tax rate, A is above-normal
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fraction of above-normal returns, the more attractive a low-tax
foreign country would be. In any event, investment in the
United States would become relatively more attractive than in-
vestment in high-tax countries.
This reasoning must be modified if foreign-source income is
not distributed currently and/or the U.S. parent is in an excess
credit position. If repatriation of foreign earnings is deferred,
taxation currently resembles an exemption. 0 2 Similarly, for
multinational corporations with excess foreign tax credits, for-
eign-source income is effectively exempt because it can be offset
by excess credits. U.S. adoption of a consumption-based tax
would eliminate these considerations and make investment in
the United States more attractive. The fact that U.S. domestic
production currently coexists with these tax inducements to in-
vestment in low-tax countries suggests that the risk of compa-
nies relocating the plants to other countries is not as great as
sometimes claimed.
2. Inbound Investment
Foreigners who invest in the United States would face the
mirror image of this problem. Two cases deserve consideration.
First, investments yielding only a normal return made by resi-
dents of countries taxing only domestic-source income would be
taxed at a lower effective rate in the United States than in the
home country. The results for investments yielding above-
normal returns would depend on tax rates and the profitability
of the investment. Given the predominance of territorial taxa-
tion in Latin America, this is the most relevant case for the
audience of this article. U.S. adoption of a territorial consump-
tion-based tax would reduce the intellectual case for shifting to
residence-based taxation.
The second case involves countries, such as the United
Kingdom and Canada, that tax the worldwide income of their
profits, T is total profits, and a is A/r, the percentage of total return represented by
above-normal returns. Thus, for example, if the United States were to levy a fiat tax of
24% and the normal return represents one half of the total return, the United States
would be competitive with a foreign country with a tax rate as low as 12%. Of course,
this discussion assumes that the investment is not location specific; if it is, tax consid-
erations would not dictate location.




multinational corporations, but offer credits for taxes paid to
foreign countries. If they were to allow credit for the consump-
tion-based tax levied by the United States, these countries
should not notice any effect on locational considerations faced by
their multinational firms that repatriate profits currently and do
not have excess credits. Below, we discuss whether such taxes
should be creditable. Lower foreign tax credits would offset
lower tax paid to the United States. 103 But firms that do not re-
patriate profits currently or that have excess foreign tax credits
would find the United States a more attractive place to invest,
particularly in industries yielding only a normal return.
Income on passive investments made in the United States by
foreigners poses a somewhat different issue because it is largely
tax-free now.104 If interest deductions were eliminated, as under
the flat tax, interest rates paid in the United States would pre-
sumably fall. This would eliminate the current preference for
passive investment in the United States and would make in-
vestment at home relatively more attractive.
3. Effects on Saving, Investment, and Interest Rates
Replacing the current income tax with a consumption-based
tax would increase the return to equity-financed investment.
This return would encourage increased equity investment, espe-
cially in the corporate sector, where double taxation of equity in-
come now occurs because of the classical system of separate
taxation of dividends and corporate income.
It has commonly been thought that the substitution of a con-
sumption-based tax for the income tax would lead to a reduction
in interest rates. There would be no net effect on the after-tax
cost of debt financing or the return to saving because interest
would no longer be taxable or deductible. This reasoning ignores
the integration of world capital markets and the benefits of ex-
pensing. Because interest rates are unlikely to fall far enough to
offset the loss of the interest deduction, the interest rate paid on
debt capital would rise. However, this effect on the cost of capi-
103. Foreign tax credits would presumably be lower because the United States would
tax only abnormal profits.
104. This discussion draws on Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Tax Laws and Capital
Flight from Latin America, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 321, 332-43 (1989).
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tal to business would be offset by the benefits of expensing.
If current preferential treatment for non-corporate invest-
ment were eliminated (the deduction of interest on home mort-
gage interest), or neutralized by making it generally available
(the exemption of interest on state and local securities), there
would be a substantial increase in the supply of funds to the cor-
porate sector. This would also counteract the tendency for inter-
est rates on corporate debt to rise. By comparison, the tendency
for saving to increase would be reduced because much of current
saving is currently tax preferred.105
4. Shifting of Income
Interest would not be deductible or taxable in the United
States under the flat tax, so there would be an incentive to shift
borrowing to other countries where interest would be deductible
and to shift interest income to the United States. 10 6 To the ex-
tent these shifts would be offset by shifts in other income or ex-
penses, there would be no net affect on revenues of foreign coun-
tries. However, it is to be expected that this would not be the
case. Transactions would be structured in such a way as to place
offsetting income in tax haven countries and offsetting deduc-
tions in countries where they could be utilized. This shifting
could create substantial loss of tax revenue for foreign countries.
The shift of debt and interest expense to other countries could be
counteracted by provisions such as thin capitalization rules.
5. The Foreign Tax Credit Issue
At various times in recent years several Latin American
countries have flirted with the idea of introducing a consump-
tion-based direct tax. Although Mexico may have been the first,
Colombia and Bolivia are the best documented.10 7 Part V briefly
105. Deferral of tax on pension saving and preferential treatment of savings invested
in owner-occupied housing are examples of such tax preferred saving.
106. For the discussion of potential abuses of the YET, see supra text accompanying
notes 58-62. See also McLure & Zodrow, supra note 33, at 335-62.
107. See generally Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Reform in an Inflationary Environ-
ment: The Case of Colombia, in WORLD TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 205, 205-25 (Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McLure, Jr., eds.,
1990); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Analysis and Reform of the Colombian Tax System, in TAX
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3, 44-78 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989). For further dis-
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describes the experience of these two countries. While perhaps
gaining in interest, especially among economists, such taxes are
generally still seen as exotic deviations from the international
norm, and therefore suspect. A serious U.S. debate on the pros
and cons of consumption-based direct taxation could focus atten-
tion on the issue throughout Latin America and the Caribbean
and lend respectability to the idea.
Any country that considers adopting a consumption-based
tax would be forced to wrestle with the issues raised above; no-
tably distributional effects, transition, and the treatment of gifts
and bequests. Moreover, it would face a particularly vexing
problem, the possibility that the United States might not allow a
foreign tax credit for cash-flow tax.
The United States has imposed the income tax since 1913.108
During that time it has built up an imposing network of treaties
with other countries intended to prevent or at least mitigate the
double taxation of income. Even where treaties do not exist, U.S.
taxpayers are allowed credits for income taxes paid to foreign
countries where they earn income. Much of the current debate
on the U.S. tax reform ignores these two facts and the stumbling
blocks they represent to successfully implementing a tax reform.
The United States allows foreign tax credits only for income
taxes and taxes on excess profits. While there is a compelling
economic case to support the credibility of a consumption-based
direct tax, 09 actually gaining creditability under existing regu-
lations is neither easy nor certain. As the yield exemption ap-
proach does not allow a deduction for interest expense, it does
not look like an income tax; nor does the CIT, because it includes
the proceeds of borrowing in the tax base. The fact that expens-
ing offsets the effects of disallowing interest deductions and the
fact that the expenditure of borrowed funds would offset the in-
clusion of borrowing in the tax base may not be dispositive for
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). A more detailed discussion
appears in the description of the Bolivian experience in Part V.B.
cussion on Colombia, see MCLURE ET AL., supra note 16, ch. 9. For further discussion on
Bolivia, see McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption.Based Direct Tax, supra note 22,
at 97-112. One thing that is known from anecdotal evidence is that Mexico feared that
the United States would not allow a foreign tax credit for a cash-flow tax. Thus, it intro-
duced a cash-flow tax only for small businesses, for whom this would be a minor concern.
108. Income Tax Law of 1913, ch. 16, § II., B., 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913).
109. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & George Zodrow, The Economic Case for Foreign Tax
Credits for Cash Flow Taxes, 51 NAT'L TAX J. (forthcoming March 1998).
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There are reasons why the issue of creditability may be more
symbolic than real. First, not all countries tax the worldwide in-
come of their taxpayers. Some countries tax only income from
domestic sources," 0 and for taxpayers from such countries, the
creditability issue is moot. Second, not all countries have rules
that are as strict--or as strictly interpreted-as the United
States. Third, creditability is an issue only when foreign-source
income is repatriated. Taxation of income that is not repatriated
more closely resembles source-based taxation. Finally, many
U.S. corporations have excess foreign tax credits. Where this is
true, creditability is a secondary issue: there will be no credits
in any event. This said, a country must nonetheless be chary
about enacting a tax that will not be credited. If nothing else,
eligibility for the foreign tax credit is a kind of "good housekeep-
ing" seal of approval.
V. THE EXPERIENCE OF COLOMBIA AND BOLIVIA
As noted earlier, three Latin American countries have toyed
with the idea of introducing a cash-flow tax on business. This is
an integral part of most proposals for a consumption-based tax.
This Part describes the experiences of Colombia and Bolivia,
which are far better documented than the Mexican experience.
A. The Colombian Experience"'
In 1986 Colombia enacted a major tax reform. 112  The
avowed purpose was to make the tax system more neutral and to
reduce incentives for decapitalization of the Colombian economy,
i.e., the substitution of debt for equity as the means of financing
businesses. In the process, the high marginal tax rates that had
long been imposed in the interest of distributional equity were
reduced substantially; the top bracket rate applied to the income
of individuals and the corporate rate were reduced from 49% and
40%, respectively, to 30%. In addition, and of special importance
in the present context, essentially complete inflation adjustment
110. France, for example, taxes only income from domestic sources.
111. For a more thorough description of this experience, see sources dealing with tax
reform in Colombia cited supra note 107. These publications also contain further refer-
ences to literature on the Colombian experience.




was provided for interest income and expense. Rather than also
indexing depreciation allowances and inventories, the govern-
ment commissioned a study of alternative ways to deal with the
effects of inflation on the measurement of income from business
and capital. The 1986 tax reform legislation provided the Presi-
dent with extraordinary powers, allowing him to decree changes
in the method of adjustment for inflation during the two-year
period ending December 31, 1988.
The study commissioned by the government 13 proposed two
basic approaches for consideration by the government: first, in-
flation adjustment of the measurement of income from business
and capital and, second, a direct consumption-based tax system,
which eliminates the need for inflation adjustment. While the
report described and analyzed two forms of consumption-based
tax-the yield exemption and the consumed income varieties
which are described above and in Appendix A-it favored the
yield exemption approach. The report called the yield exemption
approach the Simplified Alternative Tax, to indicate that is was
a simpler alternative to the standard income tax. The report
also included a preliminary but incomplete analysis of the issue
of creditability of cash-flow taxes.
Ultimately, in late 1988, the Colombian government decided
to follow the less controversial path of more comprehensive ad-
justment for inflation instead of the more novel approach of a
consumption-based tax.114 Among the considerations influencing
this choice, three deserve to be mentioned: (1) the late date at
which the study of taxation and inflation became available (mid-
November 1988) meant that there was far too little time to con-
sider carefully such a radical proposal as an introduction of a
consumption-based system before the December 31 deadline for
Presidential action; (2) it was feared that the Supreme Court
would rule that the introduction of a consumption-based system
fell outside the scope of the powers granted to the President in
the 1986 legislation; and (3) it was uncertain whether a cash-
flow tax would be eligible for foreign tax credits in the United
113. McLURE, ETAL., supra note 16, xvii.
114. In the first instance, ad hoc inflation adjustments would be made for each of
several components of income: depreciation; inventories; capital gains; and interest in-
come and expense. Subsequently, after taxpayers and the tax administration had gained
experience with this system, a switch would be made to an "integrated" system patterned
after that used in Chile. See MCLURE, ET AL., supra note 16, at 192-94, 236-37, for a de-
scription of these two approaches.
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States. The subsequent experience of Bolivia, described below,
suggests that the third concern, discussed above, might have
been dispositive, even if the first two had not been present.
B. The Bolivian Experience 15
In 1994 Bolivia was under pressure from the International
Monetary Fund to introduce a corporate income tax to bolster
revenues. 116 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, then the President of
Bolivia, expressed a strong personal interest in introducing a
cash-flow tax, instead of a standard income tax, and requested a
study of the alternatives. For simplicity reasons this unpub-
lished study (by Charles McLure and George Zodrow) focused on
developing the hybrid system that combines CIT treatment of
business with YET of individuals. It also emphasized the pos-
sibility that the IRS would not allow foreign tax credits for the
tax if it were enacted.
These fears about creditability ultimately proved to be well-
founded. Although an IRS representative met with the Presi-
dent and his advisers in Bolivia to learn of the policy reasons for
advocating the cash-flow tax and saw that only about 3% of the
base of the proposed cash-flow tax on business would not also be
subject to tax under an income tax, she stated that the proposed
tax would not be creditable. Her decision was apparently based
on her view of the "predominant character" of the proposed tax,
an aspect of the regulatory requirements for creditability. She
apparently concluded that the predominant character was such
that realizations under it would not be the same as those under
the U.S. income tax.117 She stated that the IRS "looks at the
form, not the substance" of the tax. Thus, the IRS was unwilling
to say that it would grant foreign tax credits for the hybrid tax
proposed for Bolivia.
115. The Bolivian experience is described more fully in McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid
Consumption-Based Direct Tax, supra note 22, at 97-112; Charles E. McLure, Jr. &
George Zodrow, Creditability Concerns Doom Bolivian Flat Tax, 12 TAX NOTES 1NT'L 825,
825-29 (1996).
116. Bolivia had repealed its previous corporate tax in 1986 because it yielded little
revenue, only to replace it with an assets tax that had the same problem. See generally
McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-Based Direct Tax, supra note 22.
117. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 115, at 829.
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Leaving the creditability issue aside, Bolivia in 1994-95 may
have offered the best imaginable opportunity for introducing a
cash-flow tax on business. 1 8 As in all developing countries, the
simplification and economic benefits of such a tax would have
been important. But the Bolivian situation was unique in four
respects. First, the President of the country was personally in-
terested in the proposal.119 The idea originated with him; it did
not percolate up from technocrats or foreign advisers. Accord-
ingly, this would have increased the likelihood of enactment.
Second, because Bolivia had no corporate income tax, it could not
be argued that introducing the cash-flow tax, which is commonly
seen as a substitute for an existing corporate tax, would reduce
progressivity; if anything, it would have increased progressivity
by taxing economic rents. 120 Third, for the same reason, the
transition issues that commonly plague proposals for cash-flow
taxes would have been much less severe than in most coun-
tries. 121 Fourth, Bolivia has a relatively pure VAT on which the
cash-flow tax could be piggybacked for purposes of compliance
and administration.1
22
The position of the IRS is troubling to those interested in
good public policy for several reasons. 123 First, unless the credit-
ability issue can be addressed effectively, it is virtually certain
that no other country will introduce a cash-flow tax, in spite of
its manifest advantages, especially for developing countries and
countries in transition from socialism. Second, if no other coun-
try will adopt this innovation, because of fears it would not be
creditable, the world, including the United States, will be denied
access to the practical experience that could be instrumental in
convincing skeptics of the benefits of such a tax.
118. See McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Consumption-Based Direct Tax, supra note 22,




122. McLure and Zodrow demonstrate the similarity of the bases for the VAT and
the proposed cash-flow tax and the adjustments that would be required to convert from
one to the other. Id. at 101-02.
123. The position of the IRS is troubling for a more fundamental reason: it appears
that it is inconsistent with both the U.S. Internal Revenue Code and with the regulations
interpreting the Code. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 109.
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VI. CONCLUSION: A POSTSCRIPT
Between the time this article was first prepared (late 1995)
and now (early 1998), when it is being finalized for publication,
much water has run under the bridge. Though the Republicans
retained control of both houses of Congress in the 1996 elections,
they managed through gross ineptness to cede the political high
ground to the Democrats-and thus the opportunity to make
radical changes in U.S. laws, including, perhaps, even a reform
as fundamental as restructuring of the tax system along the
lines described in Part II above. 12 4 And, of course, Steve Forbes,
the most visible advocate of the flat tax, did not win the presi-
dency in 1996. Thus, there appears to be less interest in funda-
mental restructuring of the U.S. tax system now than two years
ago. Speculating on whether there will be greater interest in the
future is pointless. This should not, however, reduce interest in
direct consumption-based taxes outside the United States.
As has been well documented elsewhere and summarized in
Part III above, the case for such taxes is strong, particularly in
less developed countries and countries in transition from social-
ism. Cash-flow taxes are both simpler and more conducive to
saving and investment than conventional income taxes-major
advantages in countries that suffer from a lack of both adminis-
trative skills and capital. Despite the existence of other prob-
lems mentioned above (e.g., distributional implications, transi-
tion problems, and the treatment of gifts and bequests), I believe
that the most important impediment to the adoption of a direct
consumption-based tax is the risk that the U.S. government
would not allow foreign tax credits for cash-flow taxes paid to
foreign governments; no country can ignore this possibility in
considering whether to adopt a cash-flow tax. Yet, I believe that
the economic and legal case for such credits is overwhelming. 125
Thus, countries that might be interested in introducing a con-
sumption-based direct tax need to find a way to insist effec-
tively-and thus perhaps multilaterally-that the United States
not, in effect, bar the door to adoption of cash-flow taxes by re-
fusing to allow foreign tax credits for them.
124. The U.S. laws were changed in 1997, but these are better described as "tax de-
form" than as tax reform. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, H.R. 2014, 105th Cong. (1997).
125. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 109.
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VII. APPENDIX A: SIX CONSUMPTION-TAX ALTERNATIVES 126
Virtually all the consumption-based taxes levied in the
world fall into the category of indirect taxes-taxes that are lev-
ied on business with the expectation that they will be shifted to
consumers who will pay the tax "indirectly." There are few ac-
tual examples of a direct consumption tax, a tax levied directly
on the consumption of individuals, commonly through wage
withholding and the filing of tax returns. The tax recently en-
acted by Croatia is the only direct consumption tax of general
applicability of which I am aware. 127 Among the possible reasons
for the absence of direct consumption-based taxes in other coun-
tries, one is paramount: a concern that the United States would
not allow its multinational corporations to take foreign tax cred-
its against liability for U.S. income tax for direct consumption-
based taxes paid to countries in which they operate.
28
The primary economic difference between direct and indirect
taxes on consumption is the capacity of the former to allow for
the circumstances of individual taxpayers. For example, since
indirect taxes do not involve tax returns, the individual's circum-
stances such as marital status, the number of children, the ag-
gregate consumption, and so forth, are not considered. It is also
possible to exempt a threshold level of consumption from a direct
tax and to impose graduated rates on consumption above that
level. Doing so avoids burdening those with low levels of con-
sumption and adds progressivity to the pattern of tax burdens.
By comparison, it is very difficult to avoid burdening the
poor under an indirect tax. An indirect tax involves exempting
food and other necessities. In addition, because the non-poor
also benefit from such exemptions, it is a very blunt and ineffi-
cient tool for protecting the poor from taxation. Thus, in order to
compensate for the burden of such taxation on the poor, it is
commonly thought necessary to link the imposition of an indirect
consumption tax with the reform of income maintenance policies.
Furthermore, it is even more difficult to achieve through taxa-
126. This appendix is based on Charles E. MeLure, Jr., A Taxpayer's Guide to Con-
sumption Taxes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 1995, at 8C. For a more detailed dis-
cussion, see McLure, supra note 19, at 345-58.
127. Still, many income taxes contain a variety of features that are more appropriate
for consumption-based taxes. Mexico taxes small business on a cash-flow basis.
128. See supra Parts IV.B.5 & V.
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tion of luxury consumption meaningful progressivity in indirect
taxation of the non-poor. Moreover, this is an administratively
cumbersome device.
A. Indirect Consumption Taxes
The RST is what most states impose, primarily on sales to
households and on many purchases by business. 12 9 Though rela-
tively simple to collect and a useful benchmark for the analysis
of other forms of consumption taxation, a federal RST seems un-
likely because it would trespass on the fiscal turf of the states.
Unless state taxes were levied as surcharges on a base defined
by the federal government, administration would be needlessly
complicated.
The VAT, 130 the revenue work-horse in Europe and the rest
of the world, achieves much the same result as the RST, but in a
different and better way. VAT is levied on all sales, but busi-
nesses are allowed credits for all tax paid on purchases, includ-
ing capital goods. As there is ultimately no tax on business pur-
chases-which is contrary to the case under the RST-VAT
affects only sales to households. Like the RST, VAT infringes on
the tax base of the states. Since the two taxes are imposed in
very different ways, it would be impossible to levy RSTs as sur-
charges on a federal VAT. Experience in Canada confirms what
many feared-that the combination of a federal VAT and state or
provincial RSTs is problematic.' 3 ' Since compliance and admini-
stration would be costly, especially for small business, VAT
makes sense only if large amounts of revenue-such as $100 bil-
lion or more-are needed. Once imposed, the VAT might become
a "money machine."
The business transfer tax (BTT), sometimes called a sub-
traction-method VAT, also does what the RST and VAT do, but
in a way that resembles the income tax. Tax is levied on the dif-
129. The taxation of business inputs implies that the RST is not a tax only on con-
sumption, that domestic production and imports are not treated similarly, and that ex-
ports do not enter international trade free of tax.
130. For a detailed exposition of the operation of the VAT and the business transfer
tax, see MCLURE, supra note 11, at 6-7, 67-69 & ch. 4.
131. However, Bird and Gendron contend that arrangements in Canada have not
proven as problematic as feared. Richard M. Bird & Pierre-Pascal Gendron, Dual VATs
and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution? 18-19 (June 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
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ference between the sales and purchases of a business, including
purchases of depreciable assets, but not wages and salaries.
Thus, to avoid taxation of business purchases, the BTT uses an
immediate deduction for expenditures by businesses, including
those for capital goods (often called "expensing"), instead of tax
credits. The BTT would be easier to implement than a VAT.
Thus, both states and businesses might object less to a BTT than
to a VAT. State RSTs could apparently co-exist with a federal
BTT, making this scheme potentially attractive. Japan is the
only developed country to have such a tax, and Japan levies it at
a relatively low rate. 
132
B. Direct Consumption Taxes
The YET, which I have previously proposed under the name
"simplified alternative tax," modifies the BTT by allowing a
business deduction for wages and by levying an individual tax on
wages above a given threshold. 133  It is the capacity to
"personalize" the taxation of wages that makes this a direct tax.
The tax-free amount would eliminate tax on low-income house-
holds, and if desired, the application of graduated tax rates to
wages above the tax-free amount would allow progressivity.
This tax also enables the possibility of itemized deductions
similar to those in the current income tax.
The "flat tax" popularized by Robert Hall and Alvin
Rabushka 13 4 and supported by Congressman Armey is a variant
of the YET. The tax is said to be "flat" because there would be a
single tax rate on wages in excess of the tax-free amount, and
the same rate would be applied to income from capital. Debt
transactions have no tax consequences under the YET. Neither
businesses nor individuals pay tax on dividends, interest, and
capital gains, and interest expense is not deductible.
132. See Shohizei.ho (Consumption Tax Law), Law No. 108 of 1988 (Japan).
133. McLure, supra note 56, at 310; MCLURE, ET AL., supra note 16, at 295-97;
McLure & Zodrow, supra note 33, at 335-82. See generally Zodrow & McLure, supra note
16, at 405-87. David F. Bradford has also supported this kind of tax. DAVID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INcOME TAX 76-77 (1986).
134. LOw TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX, supra note 14, at 19-31. See generally




The CIT treats financial transactions differently.13 5 Pro-
ceeds of borrowing, receipt of debt repayments, and interest in-
come are taxable. Lending, repayment of debt, and interest ex-
pense are deductible. 13 6 Under certain conditions the YET and
the CIT are equivalent in present value terms.137 The CIT could
accommodate either flat or graduated rates.
The hybrid consumption tax combines CIT treatment of
business with YET treatment of individuals. That is, businesses
pay tax on interest income and the proceeds of borrowing, unless
they are invested, and businesses deduct lending and interest
expense. 18  By comparison, individuals ignore all transactions in
principal and interest on debt. I think this hybrid consumption
tax is preferable to either pure form, for reasons stated in the
text-namely, it achieves the benefits of both, while avoiding
most of their pitfalls.
The USA tax combines a subtraction-method VAT on busi-
nesses with taxation of individuals that allows a deduction for
net savings. This method resembles CIT treatment but is far
more complicated and has undesirable economic consequences.
It would allow credit against the individual and business taxes
for the 7.65% payroll taxes that fund social security.
139
VIII. APPENDIX B: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ALTERNATiVE TAX
SYSTEMS 14o
Despite the inherent complexity of modern economies and
tax systems, it is possible and now common to summarize the
economic effects of the taxation of business and capital under
various tax systems by calculating the METR inherent in such
provisions as depreciation allowances, investment credits, the
treatment of interest, the rate of inflation, and adjustments for
135. BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 21, ch. 4; AARON & GALPER, su-
pro note 21, at 20-29.
136. BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, supra note 21, ch. 4; AARON & GALPER, su-
pra note 21, at 20-29.
137. For a demonstration of this proposition, see McLure & Zodrow, supra note 33,
at 335-82.
138. See generally McLure & Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach, supra note 22, at 74-77.
139. See Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, supra note 24, at 1488,
1523; Weidenbaum, supra note 24, at 57.
140. This appendix is taken from McLure & Zodrow, supra note 109. Joint Comm.,




inflation.'4 ' The METR is the percentage by which taxation re-
duces the before-tax rate of return. While METR analysis is
fairly complicated, for present purposes an extremely simplified
form of this method of analysis will suffice. It is based on a two-
period model in which a very simple investment is made in Year
1 and the return to investment occurs in Year 2.142
Assume that a firm makes an investment of $100 at the end
of Year 1. Assume further that initially it uses its own money,
rather than relying on debt finance-a complication to be consid-
ered below. The investment earns returns for only one full year
(Year 2), during which time the value of the investment asset
depreciates to zero. For convenience, all other expenses are ig-
nored except for interest, in the case of debt finance.
Two cases will be considered. In the first, the investment
return is 10%, which is assumed to equal "the" rate of interest
prevailing in the economy. Economists commonly call this the
"normal" return to capital. In the second case, the investment
pays an above-normal return of 15%.
A. Income Tax on Economic Income
1. Equity Finance
Under a tax on economic income, the cost of the investment
would be written off in the second year, since all economic de-
preciation is assumed to occur in that year. Thus, the calcula-
tion of the tax base for an equity-financed investment would be
as shown in Table B-1.
141. The locus classicus for METR analysis is MERVYN A. KING & DON FULLERTON,
THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL (1984). It has commonly been applied many
times in many countries.





Calculation of the Base of a Tax on Economic Income:
Equity Finance
10% return 15% return
Year 1
Investment Depreciated in Year 2 Depreciated in Year 2
Net taxable income 0 0
Year 2
Gross receipts 110 115
Depreciation 100 100
Net taxable income 10 15
The result is what one would expect. The income tax base is
equal to net income in the two cases: 10% of the initial invest-
ment in the first case and 15% in the second. The income tax
does not distinguish between the normal return to capital, 10%
in this example, and the above-normal return of 15%. Income
tax applies to both.
2. Debt Finance
Consider now the case of debt finance in Table B-2. Suppose
that the business borrows $100 at an interest rate of 10% and
makes an investment yielding alternatively 10% or 15%. The
debt is repaid at the end of Year 2. In Year 2 the $10 deduction
for interest expense exactly offsets the return on the investment
yielding a 10% normal return, leaving a zero tax base. The in-
come is taxed as interest income if interest is subject to tax. By
comparison, in the case of the investment yielding 15%, the




Calculation of the Base of a Tax on Economic Income:
Debt Finance
10% return 15% return









B. Consumption-Based Direct Taxes
With this background, we are ready to consider the effects of
the two consumption-based direct taxes.
1. Equity Finance
In the case of equity finance, the only analytical difference
between the consumption-based direct tax and the tax on eco-
nomic income is that under the former the cost of investment is
deducted in the first year instead of being depreciated. There is
no positive cash flow in Year 1. Therefore, this deduction must
be carried forward with interest (calculated at "the" interest rate
of 10%) to Year 2 in order to maintain its present value and
make it comparable to the monetary magnitudes in Year 2.143
143. In the case of a "stand-alone". investment, there would be an excess deduction
(negative cash flow or "losses") in the first year. Some taxpayers would be able to use the
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Table B-3 presents the calculations of taxable cash flows result-
ing from the two alternative equity-financed investments. The
benefit of expensing is sufficiently great that the normal return
to investment is effectively exempt from tax under the consump-
tion-based direct tax. However, if the investment earns
above-normal returns, such above-normal returns are taxed.
TABLE B-3
Calculation of the Base of a Consumption-Based Direct Tax:
Equity Finance
10% return 15% return
Year 1
Investment (Expensed) 100 100
Net taxable cash flow -100 -100
Year 2
Gross receipts 110 115
110% of Year 1 excess deductions 110 110
Net taxable income 0 5
2. Debt Finance
The two cash-flow taxes would treat interest and debt trans-
actions differently.
deductions currently to offset other income. The conclusions presented here are inde-
pendent of which of these analytical conventions is used. In either event, the excess de-
ductions would be carried forward with interest to offset positive cash flow in the second
year. It would be appropriate to use the prevailing 10% interest rate to compound de-




a. Consumed Income Tax
Under the CIT, proceeds of borrowing would be included in
the tax base for Year 1, and interest expense and the repayment
of debt would be deductible in Year 2. Because the proceeds of
borrowing offset investment expense, there are no excess deduc-
tions in Year 1, as there are in the case of equity finance (and the
YET considered below). Table B-4 illustrates the calculations of
the tax base under the CIT for the two years.
TABLE B-4
Calculation of the Base for the Consumption-Based Direct Tax:
Debt Finance
10% return 15% return
Year 1
Proceeds of borrowing 100 100
Investment (Expensed) 100 100
Net taxable cash flow 0 0
Year 2
Gross receipts 110 115
Repayment of debt 100 100
Interest expense 10 10
Net taxable cash flow 0 5
In the case of the 10% return, the investment only covers the
cost of borrowing and, as in the case of equity finance, there is no
tax liability. If the investment yields a return greater than the
interest rate, there is a net tax liability which is identical to that
incurred in the case of equity finance and above-normal returns.
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b. Yield Exemption Tax
Under the yield exemption tax, neither debt transactions nor
interest payments have tax consequences. The excess deductions
resulting from expensing of the investment in Year 1 are carried
forward to Year 2 with interest. Table B-5 shows the net results,
which are the same as in Table B-4, in the aggregate. If income
is exempt, neither normal nor above normal profits are taxed.
TABLE B-5
Calculation of the Base for the Yield Exemption Tax:
Debt Finance
10% return 15% return
Year 1
Investment (Expensed) 100 100
Net taxable cash flow -100 -100
Year 2
Gross receipts 110 115
110% of Year 1 excess deductions 110 110
Net taxable cash flow 0 5
Figure 1 can be used to present the results of
graphically.' 44 The three sets of blocks represent
this section
amounts of
144. As the possible existence of above-normal returns may confuse the issue, it is
convenient to recast Figure 1 to eliminate such returns, as is done below. This shows
why it is sometimes said (imprecisely) that a consumption-based direct tax is equivalent
to exemption of the return to capital. If there are no above-normal returns, such a tax is
equivalent to exemption of the return to capital.
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"income" from an equity-financed investment that are taxed un-
der various tax regimes: above-normal returns and the normal
return. The base of the tax on economic income is the total re-
turn to capital (both normal and above-normal returns). By
comparison, the base of the cash flow tax is only above normal
returns. If income is exempt, neither normal nor above normal
profits are taxed.
FIGURE 1
Components of the Tax Base under Various Regimes
Equity Financed Investment
Component of Tax Base:
Tax on Eco- Consumption- Exemption
nomic Income based tax
IX. APPENDIX C: TRANSITION ISSUES
Individuals, families, business firms, governments, and
other institutions have made countless commitments on the ex-
pectation that the income tax will continue to exist in roughly its
present form. Unless accompanied by carefully crafted transition
rules, substitution of a consumption-based tax for the income tax
would confound those expectations and create windfall gains and
Components of Tax Base under Various Tax Regimes
Equity Financed Investment, Ignoring Above-normal Returns
I Normal returns I Taxed
Tax on Economic
Income





losses. 15 A few examples should help clarify this.
Expensing replaces depreciation allowances under a con-
sumption-based tax. This raises the issue of how to handle the
existing undepreciated capital stock. On the one hand, allowing
immediate write-off for the remaining basis would entail large
revenue losses. On the other, requiring that the remaining basis
be written off according to original depreciation schedules would
place owners of existing depreciable assets at a competitive dis-
advantage, relative to owners of new assets, which would be ex-
pensed. In any case, existing assets would presumably benefit
from expensing if sold. Such "churning" is not efficient (unless it
is merely a tax-motivated paper sham with no substance).
The USA tax would allow depreciable assets with remaining
recovery lives of fifteen years or less to be written off over ten
years; assets with remaining lives of more than fifteen years
would be recovered over thirty years. On average these rules
seem very harsh.
The USA tax takes an even more draconian approach to sev-
eral other issues of business taxation. It would eliminate car-
ryovers for net operating losses and capital losses, for foreign tax
credits, and for credits for minimum tax paid in prior years.
Existing debt creates another type of problem. Under the
flat tax, interest is neither taxable nor deductible. But how
should interest on existing indebtedness be treated if a flat tax is
adopted? Continuing income-tax treatment of outstanding debt
would postpone realization of the flat tax's simplicity benefits
and would probably lead to abuse. However, if flat-tax treat-
ment were extended to interest on existing debt, there would be
huge windfall gains (to creditors, who would receive interest tax-
free) and losses (to debtors, who could not deduct interest ex-
pense). Debtors would probably not simply call debt and reissue
it at lower interest rates; much debt does not have call features.
The CIT has different transition problems. Under the CIT,
tax is paid on dissaving. But what about savings that have been
accumulated under the income tax, from after-tax income?
145. For a more complete discussion of transition issues, see Shounak Sarkar &
George R. Zodxow, Transitional Issues in Moving to a Direct Consumption Tax, 46 NA'L
TAX J. 359, 359-76 (1993); Joint Comm., supra note 13, at 83-92 and literature cited
therein; David F. Bradford, Consumption Tax Alternatives: Implementation and Transi-
tion Issues, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 123, 123-50 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
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(Savings accumulated from before-tax income, with the expecta-
tion that they will be taxed upon distribution, are less problem-
atic; they are already taxed under CIT principles.) Subjecting
them to taxation when dissaving occurs would impose large
windfall losses on holders of existing wealth, many of whom ex-
pect to rely on such savings for retirement income. The compli-
cated proposal to deal with this problem under the USA tax, dis-
cussed in the text, is quite unsatisfactory.
